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Abstract 
On 18 January 1960, LIFE magazine began a series of articles on democracy around the 
world. The newly independent nation of Ghana (1957) was featured in Part 1 and the 
cover photograph was of Augustus Molade Akiwumi, the Speaker of the House in Ghana, 
dressed in British-style wig and robes. The title of the feature article read, ‘Ghana’s Leap 
from Stone Age to Eager New Nationhood’. The feature explains that in Ghana ‘Courts are 
being built, and in lower courts the temporary local judges are being replaced with more 
qualified appointees to settle local disputes and initiate the people in the mechanics of 
Western justice’. However in stark contrast to the portrayal of pre-colonial Ghana as ‘Stone 
Age’ the Asanti peoples of Ghana developed a complex, hierarchical society and legal 
system centuries before Europeans ever arrived on the continent. In critical reflection of the 
magazine cover, this article is founded on demonstrating how the colonial, post-colonial, 
apartheid and post-apartheid state have through an oppressive stance suppressed 
indigenous religious and cultural diversity. In addition, it is asserted that the current 
constitutional arrangements have not at all times effectively dealt with this subjugation. It is 
presupposed that unless a positive approach towards religious and cultural integrity is 
displayed and an environment is created in which these rights to freedom of religion and 
culture may prosper, the constitutional endeavour of establishing unity and solidarity in 
our diverse society will remain elusive. In conclusion, some approaches to enhancing this 
constitutional endeavour are proffered. 
I     Introduction1 
Colonial and post-colonial suppression of indigenous religious and cultural diversity as 
well as the oppressive relationship of the colonial and apartheid state has done much in 
minimising the value and importance of indigenous religious and cultural systems. It is 
contended that the current constitutional arrangement has not at all times adequately 
addressed this underestimation of indigenous religious and cultural diversity. This 
1 This article is based on a paper presented at the Symposium on Religious Rights and Freedoms, jointly organised by the Faculty of 
Law, University of the Free State and the South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International 
Law (a centre of the Faculty of Law, University of Johannesburg) in collaboration with Juta & Co Ltd, September 2011, Constitutional 
Hill, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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Consequently, a traditional cultural practice such as Umkhosi Wokweshwama, (celebration of 
the first fruits) practised amongst the Zulu people, in which a beast is killed to mark the 
first fruits before the crops are harvested, has been negatively assessed. In the light of this 
and other forms of legal and moral criticism of indigenous religious and cultural practices, 
this article will argue that for the right to freedom of religion and culture to be adequately 
protected the interrelated nature of these rights must be appreciated. 
 
This article will firstly set out how the concepts of religion and culture are interrelated. 
Thereafter the article will illustrate how religion and culture in South Africa have been 
entwined with the economic, social, and political relations of power that have privileged 
some, but have excluded many others.3 The domination of the Christian Protestant faith in 
                                                          
2 Within the scope of this article the impact of urbanisation, as well as other influences such as racial segregation and separation of the 
land, on traditional cultural and religious values will not be explored. 




particular brought about many incidents of conflict with indigenous culture and religion.4             
This oppressive attitude has done much in minimising the value and importance of 
indigenous religious and cultural systems. In addition, it is suggested that this 
delegitimisation has not at all times been addressed effectively by the current constitutional 
arrangement. Finally, some suggestions on how to ensure that the constitutional endeavour 
of establishing unity and solidarity in our diverse society is attained are put forward. 
 
II Interrelated nature of the concepts of ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ 
Religion is not defined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Similarly,  
there  is  no  generally  accepted definition  for  religion  in international law that may be of 
assistance.5 However, Peter Edge and Graham Harvey provide the following definition: 
‘Religions are diverse ways of being human and there are many various ways of being 
religious. All are concerned with ways of seeing and being in the world.’6 In line with this 
definition of religion being a way of seeing and being in the world, this article proceeds 
from an alternative approach to defining the concept of religion, in terms of which the 
value of the role of religion in the lives of adherents is recognised, through emphasising the 
various ‘facets’ of religion.7 Three ‘facets’ can be identified: firstly, religion as a belief; 
secondly, religion as a way of life; and thirdly, religion as an identity. Religion as a belief 
accentuates, for example, the existence of a deity or the adherence to doctrines. The second 
‘facet’ of religion accentuates religion as a way of life. In this facet religion is associated with 
actions and rituals that may distinguish the believer from adherents of other religions. The 
traditional Christian view of religion focuses primarily on religion as belief and, moreover, 
religion as a private belief.8 For adherents of other religions, the belief component may be of 
less importance. Religion, as a way of life, may perhaps be the most salient aspect of their 
lives. For example, adherence to their religion may impose certain social practices, for 
example that certain dietary requirements, religious dress or grooming requirements be 
complied with. 
 
In terms of the traditional Christian view of religion, western states are reluctant to make 
accommodations for this religious way of life and in doing so often reveal the dominant 
facet of the religion of the majority of the state as a religion of belief.9  These states may 
claim that by enforcing so called laws’ that are applicable to all religious and ethnic groups, 
the state laws’ that are applicable to all religious and ethnic groups, the state is treating all 
religions as equal. However, adherents to religion as a way of life may suffer 
disproportionately. This may have a devastating impact on the individual’s ability to practise 
                                                          
4 At the same time European Christianity itself became the endorsed worldview in Africa. In this regard see Chidester Ibid 37. In 
addition, missionary teachings undermined the political authority of chiefs and subverted the social order of African societies. See 
Chidester Ibid 44.  
5 Neither the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) nor the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) 
developed detailed definitions. See generally MW Janis & C Evans (eds) Religion and International Law (1999); P Cumper ‘Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience and Belief’ in D Harris & S Joseph The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and United Kingdom 
Law (1995). 
6 PW Edge & G Harvey Law and Religion in Contemporary Society Communities, Individualism and the State (2000) 8–9. 
7 JT Gunn ‘Definition of “Religion” in International Law’ (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights LJ 189, 200. 
8 Ibid 204. 




her religion.10 For these reasons it is necessary to find alternative approaches to defining 
religion. 
 
(a)   Religion as identity 
None of the international or national instruments mentioned previously provide for a 
specific right to identity. Consequently, no definition for the right to identity exists. The 
South African Constitutional Court in the matter of Pillay,11 however, convincingly reasons 
for the importance of identity as follows: ‘Dignity and identity are inseparably linked as 
one’s sense of self- worth is defined by one’s identity.’12 
 
Identity is therefore linked to the self-worth of an individual. The importance of self-
worth is appreciated by John Rawls who speaks of a ‘sense of belonging’.13 A sense of 
belonging is made possible through the individuals’ location in, for example, a religious or 
cultural community. Religion as identity accentuates affiliation with a group, such as 
ethnicity, race or nationality. Religion as identity is accepted by Elizabeth Benito,14 who 
holds that ‘religion usually encompasses more than faith. Often it is the focal point of the 
cultural tradition of a group’.15 In this regard it can be said that for many believers religious 
practices may form the core component of their personal identity or the identity of the 
given community to which they belong. Although religion is usually concerned with personal 
faith and culture typically relates to traditions of a community, there can be an overlap 
between the two, as custom often develops in line with a community’s spiritual beliefs. 
Cultural beliefs may be as strongly held as religious convictions. For example, dress codes 
that may have been religiously prescribed may simultaneously be the focal point of 
identification of the cultural group. In addition, it is sometimes impossible to separate 
defining characteristics of a group’s cultural composition, as religious belief is often an 
integral part of ethnicity.1616 Both religion and ethnicity play an important role in people’s 
self-identity. Religion may further form the foundation of the existence of a specific ethnic 
group as supported by the following definition of ethnic group as a group of people who are 
seen as: 
 
[S]haring a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on a belief in a common origin, 
a common history and a common destiny [as well as] culturally specific practices and beliefs. 
Physical appearance, language, a shared territory and religious beliefs may further contribute 
in varying degrees to ethnic identity. 17 
 
                                                          
10 Ibid 214. 
11 MEC for Education KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC); 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC). 
12 Ibid para 53 (own emphasis added). 
13 J Rawls A Theory of Justice (1971) 62. See also I Berlin Four Essays on Liberty (1969) 154–60. 
14 EO Benito, Special Rapporteur on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief for the 
period 1983 to 1986. 
15 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 
Sub-Commission on the Prevention and Protection of Minorities, Commission on Human Rights, Economic and Social Council, 39th 
session para 183 UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub 2/1987/26/(1986). 
16 J Haynes ‘Religion, Secularisation and Politics: A Postmodern Conspectus’ (1997) 18 Third World Quarterly 709, 721. 




Identity consequently relates to various distinctive characteristics such as language, 
culture and religion; these aspects are all relative. However, the very nature of universal 
human rights prefers to deal with universalities and generalities.18 Consequently, the 
importance of these relative attributes is often insufficiently considered. Regarding the 
definition of religion as identity, it is further important to acknowledge the cultural and 
ethnic interconnection. 
 
(b)   Cultural, ethnic and racial interconnection of identity 
The interconnection between race and religion is suitably portrayed among the people in 
the Cape during the 17th and 18th centuries. Religion rather than race provided the 
categories for defining differences. Religion was also often interlaced with ethnicity or 
nationality. For example Muslims in the Cape were referred to as ‘Malays’.19 In Natal too, 
ethnicity or nationality was attached in a similar manner. Muslim merchants from India 
settling in Natal set themselves apart from Indian labourers, who were mostly Hindu, 
through calling themselves ‘Arabs’.20 
 
Religion, race,21 and ethnicity22 are all types of cultural groupings. The concept ‘cultural 
group’ refers to a group of people who to a large extent share similar customs, lifestyles, 
values, religious beliefs, historical continuity, physical characteristics and/or language.23 
The overlap between ethnicity and religion has also been recognised by Abdelfattah Amor, 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, who states that: 
 
[T]he distinctions between racial and religious categories … are not clear … There are 
borderline cases where racial and religious distinctions are far from clear-cut. Apart from 
any discrimination, the identity of many minorities, or even large groups of people, is defined 
by both racial and religious aspects. Hence, many instances of discrimination are aggravated 
by the effects of multiple identities … 24 
 
The importance of religion and ethnicity (or race) is situated in the fact that religion and 
race not only have significance for the individual within the framework of the religious 
belief system or biological foundation of race. Religion and ethnicity (or race) create a 
collective identity as well, which has a cultural and social significance for the individual.25 
Therefore, race, ethnicity and religion are indicative of the individual’s self-identity as well 
                                                          
18 C Douzinas ‘Identity, Recognition, Rights or What can Hegel Teach us About Human Rights?’ (2002) 29 J of Law and Society 379, 
402. 
19 In this regard see Chidester (note 3 above) 162 where he refers to a comment in the 1860s by an aristocratic English visitor to the 
Cape, Lucy Duff Gordon. 
20 F Ginwala ‘Class, Consciousness and Control: Indian South Africans, 1860–1946’. DPhil thesis, Oxford University (1974) 136. 
21 The term race or racial group usually refers to the categorisation of humans into populations or ancestral groups on the basis of 
various sets of heritable characteristics. The physical features commonly seen as indicating race are salient visual traits such as skin 
colour, cranial or facial features and hair texture. 
22 Ethnicity like race is concerned with the notion of descent or genealogy. The terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic group’ are derived from the 
Greek word ethnos, normally translated as ‘nation’ or commonly said of people of the same race that share a distinctive culture. 
23 Y Tseming ‘Race, Religion, and Cultural Identity: Reconciling the Jurisprudence of Race and Religion’ (1997) 37 Indiana LJ 119, 
127. 
24 UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, A Amor ‘Racial Discrimination and Religious Discrimination: 
Identification and Measures’ [29] UN Doc A/CONF.189/PC. 1/7(2000). 




as of the individual’s sense of belonging to a cultural community. Consequently, the 
similarities between race, ethnicity and religion are located within the fact that all play 
comparable roles in determining the position of an individual as well as a cultural 
community within society.26 
 
The interrelated nature of religion and culture as well as the role thereof in the cultural 
community, as reasoned for above, is also confirmed by the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights in the matter of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya.27 In this 
matter, the indigenous Endorois community was displaced from their ancestral lands by the 
Kenyan government through the gazetting of the Lake Bogoria Game Reserve. Of relevance 
for this article are the alleged violations of the Endorois community’s right to practise their 
religion28 and culture.29 The Endorois claim their health, livelihood, religion and culture 
are all intimately connected with their traditional land, as grazing lands, sacred religious 
sites, historical prayer sites, places for circumcision rituals, and other cultural 
ceremonies are all situated around the shores of Lake Bogoria.30 The Endorois believe that 
spirits of all former Endorois, no matter where they are buried, live on in the lake.31 The 
lake is therefore essential to the religious practices and beliefs of the Endorois.32 By 
restricting access to Lake Bogoria, access to a central element of Endorois cultural practice 
has been denied. The African Commission confirms that the concept of indigenous peoples 
recognises the linkages between peoples, their land, and culture and that such a group 
expresses its desire to be identified as a people.33 The African Commission is further of the 
view that Endorois culture, religion, and traditional way of life are intimately intertwined 
with their ancestral lands – Lake Bogoria and the surrounding area. It agrees that Lake 
Bogoria is central to the Endorois’ way of life and without access to their ancestral land, 
the Endorois are unable to fully exercise their cultural and religious rights, and feel 
disconnected from their land and ancestors.34 The Commission is aware that religion is 
often linked to land, cultural beliefs and practices.35 The Commission therefore holds the 
view that denying access to the lake is a restriction on their freedom to practise their 
religion36 and a violation of cultural rights in that the community has faced systematic 
restrictions on access to cultural sites.37 
 
                                                          
26 Ibid 121. 
27 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 276/03 (Endorois). 
28 Article 8 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights states ‘Freedom of conscience, the profession and free practice of 
religion shall be guaranteed. No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these freedoms’. 
29 Articles 17(2) & (3) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights states ‘(2) Every individual may freely take part in the 
cultural life of his community. (3) The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values recognised by the community shall be 
the duty of the State’. 
30 Endorois (note 27 above) para 16. 
31 Ibid para 79. 
32 Ibid para 16. 
33 Ibid para 151. 
34 Ibid para 156. 
35 Ibid para 166. 
36 Ibid para 173. 




From the above discussion it is apparent that the African Commission too appreciates 
the interrelated nature of religion and culture, which the Commission confirms as 
follows: 
 
It thus understands culture to mean that complex whole which includes a spiritual and 
physical association with one’s ancestral land, knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, customs, 
and any other capabilities and habits acquired by humankind as a member of society – the 
sum total of the material and spiritual activities and products of a given social group that 
distinguish it from other similar groups. It has also understood cultural identity to 
encompass a group’s religion, language, and other defining characteristics.38 
 
This article concurs with the above appreciation of the interrelated nature of religion and 
culture. It further maintains that the interrelated nature of religion and culture is a positive 
step in creating an environment in which, in particular, the right to indigenous religions and 
cultures may prosper. However, this awareness further requires a consciousness regarding 
the impact of historical domination on indigenous cultural and religious diversity, as 
discussed next. 
 
III The impact of historical religious and cultural domination on indigenous 
cultural and religious diversity and in particular customary law  
The presence of Christianity in South Africa can be traced to the arrival of the Dutch East 
India Company in 1652. The Cape Colony, under the Dutch East India Company prohibited 
any other religion at the Cape besides the Dutch Reformed Church until 1778.39  The 
history of religious conflict in South herefore is symbolic of, in particular, the domination of 
the Protestant herefore is symbolic of, in particular, the domination of the Protestant faith. 
Examples of discriminatory behaviour against other faiths are plentiful. For example, 
permission to build the first Muslim mosque was only granted in 1798.40 Traditional 
African religion too was not left untouched from the influence of Christian domination, 
and the Christian mission became a space for the endorsement of a particular European 
Christian worldview in Africa.41 The bias towards the Protestant faith was also prevalent in 
the actions of the local authorities. For example, in 1856, municipal authorities in Cape 
Town banned the annual religious festival of Khalifa (also known as Ratiep) as ‘dangerous 
to the law and peace of the community’.42 During the festival Muslim devotees enacted a 
show that included self-torture by way of sticking sharp spears or swords through their 
bodies. 
 
                                                          
38 Ibid para 241. 
39 At this time the religion of slaves was determined in terms of an ordinance (1770) that prohibited the buying or selling of slaves who 
had converted to Christianity. In light of this prohibition, slave-owners excluded their slaves from Christian conversion or baptism in 
order to retain property rights over them. In this regard see Chidester (note 3 above) 35. See generally P Coertzen ‘Freedom of Religion 
in South Africa: Then and Now 1652–2008’ (2008) 29 Verbum Et Ecclesia J 345. 
40 Chidester (note 3 above) 151. 
41 Ibid 37. 




The domination of the Protestant faith also violated the communal expressions of 
traditional African religions43 and individual conscience of Africans. The traditions and 
religions of Africans were alluded to as being from the Stone Age, and therefore subverted. 
In doing this many Africans have been deprived of essential elements of their humanity.44 
This paternalistic approach deemed, for example, African dances, marriage ceremonies 
and actions of worship as incompatible with Christianity. Through a process of continued 
acculturation African religions have in many instances suffered harm or destruction.45 
 
Nonetheless, the abandonment of indigenous culture and religion did not occur. Over time 
colonial courts where permitted to apply customary law in so far as it was ‘not repugnant to 
the general principles of humanity observed throughout the civilised world’.46 To ease the 
application in colonial courts various systems of customary law were written to code.47 
In due course, traditional leaders and native commissioners were appointed to adjudicate 
over civil customary disputes.48 
 
However, the various systems of customary law were not applied uniformly throughout the 
territories.49 For example, in the previous Transvaal customary marriages and lobolo 
agreements were not recognised on the basis that polygamy and the payment of a ‘bride price’ 
was uncivilised.50 With the merger to a Union51 the need to develop an integrated 
approach was evident. The Native Administrations Act 38 of 1927 was introduced to re-
create traditional authority in terms of which customary law was applied in separate 
systems of courts by traditional leaders and native commissioners. The recognition of 
customary law was associated with race and the application was considered subordinate to 
the legal system of the Union. 
 
It is clear that customary law was not fully recognised as a component of the South 
African legal system. Traditionally, customary law was at best treated with indifference52 or 
                                                          
43 This paternalistic approach was not only directed towards African religions but also targeted the fields of medicine, politics and 
economics. MW Mutua ‘Limitations on Religious Rights: Problematizing Religious Freedom in the African Context’ in JD van der 
Vyver & J Witte Jr (eds) Religious Human Rights in a Global Perspective Legal Perspectives (1996) 417, 428. 
44 Ibid 418. See also generally JS Pobee ‘Africa’s Search for Religious Human Rights through Returning to the Wells of Living Water’ 
in Van der Vyver & Witte Ibid 391  
45 Ibid 420. For a differing perspective see generally L Van der Poll ‘The Impact of Traditional Sex Practices on the Construction of 
Female Sexuality: An African Human Rights Perspective’ (2009) 13 Law, Democracy & Development 1. 
46 Proclamation 110 & 112 of 1879 s 23. 
47 Codification was favoured by colonist and lawyers who wanted the Rule of Law applied. However, as M Chanock Making of the 
South African Legal Culture 1902–1936; Fear Favour and Prejudice (2000) 249 argues, the effect of codification was to ‘shift control 
of African law away from African and place it in the hands of white administrators and magistrates’.  
48 EH Brookes The History of the Native Policy in South Africa from 1830 to Present Day (1924) 130. 
49 Cape, Natal, Transvaal and Orange Free State. 
50 See Meesadoosa v Links 1915 TPD 357, 358. The non-recognition of potentially polygamous marriages was first entrenched in 1912 
when a South African court ruled that all polygamous marriages, permitted in both Hindu and Muslim practice, were illegal in South 
Africa. See generally A Kerr ‘Back to the Problems of a Hundred or More Years Ago: Public Policy Concerning Contracts Relating to 
Marriages that are Potentially or Actually Polygamous’ (1984) 101 SALJ 445. Regarding the illegality of Muslim marriages see Esop v 
Union Government (Minister of the Interior) 1913 CPD 133. In the case of Esop it was held by the court that ‘Mariam is in law the 
concubine and not the wife of the applicant’. Consequently numerous Indian wives were reduced to concubines. Gandhi interpreted the 
judgment to imply that all marriages not concluded in terms of Christian rites were null and void. In this regard, see generally W le 
Roux ‘Conscience Against the Law: Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and Bram Fischer as Practising Lawyers During the Struggle’ 
(2001) XXXXII CODICILLVS 36. 
51 The Union Constitution (South Africa Act 1909 (9 Edw VII, c 9)). 




at worst not recognised.53 Adherents were persuaded to abandon their tribal ways in 
preference of Christianity and at first a Dutch and later a British conception of civilisation,54 
reminiscent of the crude cover of LIFE Magazine titled ‘Ghana’s Leap from Stone Age to 
Eager New Nationhood’. 
 
This  bias  was  formally  corrected  with  the  passing  of  the  interim Constitution
55   and 
confirmed in the final Constitution.56 The onset of the interim Constitution was 
engineered to bring change to the subordination of indigenous religious and cultural 
diversity.57  The South African Constitution is  the  supreme  law  of  South  Africa  and  any  
law  inconsistent  with  the provisions contained therein is invalid.58 Chapter 2 contains a 
Bill of Rights, which is the cornerstone of the democracy and enshrines the rights of all the 
while affirming the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.59 The right 
to freedom of religion is specifically included as a fundamental right of everyone60 and is 
extensively referred to throughout the Constitution.61 The right to culture too is specifically 
included as a fundamental right of everyone.62 Furthermore, the right of persons belonging 
to cultural, religious or linguistic communities to enjoy their culture, practice their religion 
and use their language is referred to in the Constitution.63 The state must accordingly 
tolerate and allow for different cultural practices, may not discriminate against any cultural 
group and must preserve the identity of the group. Cultural groups must be allowed to 
promote their own autonomous identity. Section 31 contains an internal limitation, which 
determines that the right to culture may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
 
Courts are also now constitutionally obliged to apply customary law. Section 211(3) provides 
that the courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the 
Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law. Accordingly, 
customary law is placed on an equal footing with the Roman Dutch Legal System. When 
applying customary law, s 39(2) provides that every court, when interpreting or developing 
                                                          
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid 36. 
55 The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, which came into force on 27 April 1994. The interim 
Constitution was the result of negotiations between the representatives of the apartheid state and its opponents. Interim Constitution s 
14.  
56 Constitution ss 15, 30 & 31. 
57 For a general overview of religious human rights in South Africa before and shortly after the first democratic elections in 1994 see 
generally LM du Plessis ‘Religious Human Rights in South Africa’ in Van der Vyver & Witte (note 43 above) 441; see generally LM du 
Plessis ‘Religion, Law and State in South Africa’ (1997) 4 European J for Church and State Research 221. 
58 Constitution s 2. 
59 See Constitution s 7(1) which provides: ‘The Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all 
people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom’. The drafting of the South African 
Constitution was influenced by libertarians focusing on individual liberty while egalitarians emphasised equality as the central value. 
The tension between a libertarian and an egalitarian approach is also prevalent in the discourse pertaining to the right to freedom of 
religion and the right to manifest religious beliefs that may be limited. 
60 Constitution s 15. 
61 See the Preamble of the Constitution as well as s 6 which includes within the linguistic rights ‘Arabic, Hebrew, Sanskrit and other 
languages used for religious purposes’, s 15 which guarantees the right to freedom of religion, s 16, which contains a general freedom of 
expression clause, does not apply to advocacy of hatred based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion where it constitutes incitement to 
cause harm. See also ss 31, 35, 48, 95, 107, 135 & schedule 2 of the Constitution.  
62 Constitution s 30. 




customary law the spirit of the Bill of Rights must be promoted. The spirit of the Bill of 
Rights relates to the values of human dignity, equality and freedom. For this reason no 
discussion of the right to freedom of religion and the right to freedom of culture is 
complete without reference to human dignity and equality. 
 
IV Dignity and equality in relation to the application of the right to religion and 
culture 
The role of religious and cultural practices in relation to human dignity and equality is 
confirmed in that: ‘[R]eligious and cultural practices are protected because they are central 
to human identity and hence to human dignity which is in turn central to equality.’64  Laurie 
Ackerman too has advocated that dignity e highly valued as a constant reminder of our past 
of inequality and discrimination.65 The impact of the past of inequality and discrimination 
on the value of indigenous cultural and religious practices has been reflected on. This article 
therefore next turns to the importance of dignity and equality. 
 
With regard to dignity, Stuart Woolman identifies the following relevant definitions.66 
First, dignity is defined as a means of allowing the individual to consider herself as an end-in 
herself. This notion is in reaction to the domination of the past and the attempts to deny 
many the ‘right of self-identification and self-determination’.67 Second, dignity is defined as 
acknowledging the notion of equal concern and equal respect. This approach allows for 
the right to equality to play a relevant role in the recognition of the definition of dignity as 
equal concern and respect. 
 
Accordingly, there clearly is an interrelation between dignity and equality. In this regard 
Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education affirms that equality does not 
require that we treat everyone in the same way, but that we treat everyone with equal 
concern and equal respect.68 Goldstone J confirms this interrelation between dignity and 
equality as follows: 
 
[A]t the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that the purpose 
of our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all 
human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership in 
particular groups.69 
 
A third meaning of dignity is related to dignity as self-actualisation. This notion is 
confirmed by Ackerman who expresses this understanding of dignity as follows ‘An 
individual’s human dignity cannot be fully respected or valued unless the individual is 
                                                          
64 Pillay (note 11 above) para 62. 
65 LWH Ackerman ‘The Legal Nature of the South African Revolution’ New Zealand Law Review (2004) 633, 650 
66 S Woolman ‘Dignity’ in S Woolman & M Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2008) 6. 
67 Ackerman (note 65 above) 649. 
68 2000 (10) BCLR para 42. 




permitted to develop his or her unique talents optimally’.70 Further ways of defining dignity 
relate to self-governance and the collective dignity of the group. 
 
In particular, dignity defined in relation to self-identification, self-determination and self-
actualisation, allowing the individual to develop optimally and permitting the individual 
the ability to give meaning to her life is relevant to both the right to freedom of religion and 
culture. Similarly, dignity defined in relation to the equal concern and respect of an 
individual is closely associated with the value and right to equality. From these definitions it 
is clear that both equality and dignity are of importance when applying the right to freedom 
of religion and the right to freedom of culture. 
 
Dignity is however not only defined in different ways, but operates in different respects 
as well. Dignity may function as a specific right, for example the right to dignity, as 
entrenched in s 10.71   Additionally, dignity may determine how the entrenched right is 
applied. To illustrate this determination, in the application of the right to equality, the test 
to determine if an infringement occurs, requires an investigation into whether or not the 
differentiation results in an impairment of human dignity, which then may determine if 
the differentiation amounts to actual discrimination. Dignity may also function as a 
correlative right, in that there is a relationship between the right to dignity and individual 
freedom, as affirmed in the Hugo case as follows: ‘[D]ignity is at the heart of individual 
rights in a free and democratic society …’72 
 
Dignity is most often referred to as a value or Grundnorm. The reason, therefore, is that 
various provisions in the Bill of Rights and the rights themselves must be interpreted so 
as to ‘promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom’.73 In South Africa, Drucilla Cornell contends that a 
substantive revolution has inverted the order of apartheid, which denied the dignity of the 
black majority, by making the respect for the dignity of all others the Grundnorm of the entire 
Constitution.74 
 
Dignity therefore stands in relation to the application of all other rights and these rights 
shape our understanding of dignity. For that reason dignity has particular  relevance  to  
our  understanding  of  the  right  to  freedom of religion and culture. Similarly, the right to 
equality is of particular relevance to our appreciation of the right to freedom of religion and 
culture. The interrelationship between dignity and equality in many ways can be 
comparable to the interrelation that exists between religion and culture as illustrated 
previously. For diversity to prosper it is essential that the value of dignity and equality as 
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well as the interrelation between religion and culture are held when addressing issues 
regarding the manifestation of indigenous culture and religion, in particular. 
 
V The manifestation of indigenous religion and culture in a democratic South 
Africa 
Counter to the colonial model that predicted the disappearance of indigenous culture and 
religion, these practices continue today, alongside modern systems of law and religion. 
Nonetheless, the impact of colonisation on these practices remains prevalent, as it is often 
more difficult to erase the permeation of subordination on the manner in which the right 
to freedom of religion and the right to culture is evolving in South Africa. In this regard 
Martin Chanock c o n f i r m s  that law was a major tool utilised by the European colonisers 
as an instrument of the power of an alien state and part of the process of coercion.75 Existing 
legal systems and culture therefore represent the unequal distribution of power.  As shown 
previously, this unequal representation of power is especially prevalent in the application 
of customary law, the law by which millions of people live and who respect its dictates. 
 
The South African Constitution recognises customary law and provides that ‘[t]he courts 
must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and 
any legislation that specifically deals with customary law’.76 The South African 
Constitutional Court has recognised the subordination of the past and has shown 
appreciation of diversity as follows: 
 
Value of acknowledging diversity and pluralism in our society … affirm[ed] the right of 
people to self-expression without being forced to subordinate themselves to the cultural and 
religious norms of others, and highlight[ed] the importance of individuals and communities 
being able to enjoy what has been called the ‘right to be different’.77 
 
The question of how to determine what the customary law is, is however crucially 
important.78 Van der Westhuizen J recognises in Shilubana v Nwamitwa that the 
stagnation of customary law was inevitable under apartheid.79 However, flexibility of the 
living customary law must be balanced against other factors such as legal certainty, vested 
rights and the protection of constitutional rights under the new dispensation. The 
Constitutional Court has therefore distinguished between the so-called ‘codified’ 
customary law and the ‘living’ customary law as experienced by those living within the 
custom.80 Appreciation of the fact that the content of rights may change over time is central 
to the jurisprudence in the South African Constitutional Court as well as to the issue of how 
the content of living customary law should be ascertained. Normally the source of living 
customary law is related back to the ancestors. Therefore, although the living customary 
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law can evolve and change, and indeed certainly has been changing, the question of 
change is complex. 
 
In this regard Thandabantu Nhlapo alerts to the fact that legal elites may have deeply 
internalised values of modernisation and westernisation to the extent that they may at 
times be unwilling to share an ethical space with alternative world views, which may be 
consistent with the respect for the dignity of all persons in South Africa.81 Furthermore, as 
De Villiers has claimed, the examination thereof must be met with caution as it all too often 
leads us back to the customary law that was inscribed by the colonisers of South Africa.82 
In light of the above, this article therefore maintains that the manner in which the content 
of customary law is determined is especially vulnerable. This vulnerability is related to the 
fact that customary practices, ceremonies and rituals tend to reflect a value system that 
challenges western principles and provides fertile ground for rights-based critiques. It is, 
in particular, the possible responses to these rights-based critiques that this article seeks 
to identify. This article reasons that conflict within legal systems could be utilised to 
destabilise current certainties and allows for alternative ways of interpretation to be 
revealed. In the search for alternative ways of interpretation this article relies on the 
indeterminacy of all rights claims, which is illustrative of the debate about what ‘the society 
is and what it ought to be’.83 In so far as the social is constructed and revolves around a 
set of choices that have been made. Accordingly, any understanding of the social should 
centre on appreciating that nothing is necessary and that everything is contingent.84 The 
appreciation of the interrelated nature of religion and culture is related to this 
understanding. This article further has revealed the tensions within the legal system and 
the ideological and material forces that underpin them. In so doing the sense of necessity in 
legal doctrine has been weakened and the need to re-create the legal system by showing that 
‘it exists in a cultural context’ in which society is understood to be made and imagined, 
rather than given, is highlighted.85 
 
The need to transform society is also founded and confirmed in the provisions of both the 
interim86 and final Constitution. In this regard it has been remarked that: 
 
Our Constitution encompasses a transformative provision. As such, the State cannot be a 
passive bystander in shaping the society in which individuals can fully enjoy their rights? 
[T]he full transformative power of the rights in the Bill of Rights will only be realised when 
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they are interpreted with reference to the specific social and economic context prevalent in 
the country as a whole, and the social and economic context within which the applicant now 
finds itself in particular.87 
 
To this end Pius Langa has remarked that transformation is not only the duty of the judiciary, 
but that transformation must be coupled with legislative reform and executive action 
together with the social transformation of society.88 
 
VI Transformation and the living customary law 
The judgment in Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha89 rejects ‘official customary law’ as a ‘poor 
reflection, if not a distortion of the true customary law’. It holds that ‘[t]rue customary law 
will be that which recognises and acknowledges the changes which continually take 
place’.90 The need for change is also emphasised by Moseneke J in Gumede v President of 
the Republic of South Africa where he states that ‘during colonial times, the great difficulty 
resided in the fact that customary law was entirely prevented from evolving and 
adapting as the changing circumstances of the communities required’.91 
 
Regarding the evolving nature of customary law, the Constitutional Court in Shilubana held 
that: 
 
As has been repeatedly emphasised by this and other courts, customary law is by its nature 
a constantly evolving system. Under pre-democratic colonial and apartheid regimes, this 
development was frustrated and customary law stagnated. This stagnation should not 
continue, and the free development by communities of their own laws to meet the needs of a 
rapidly changing society must be respected and facilitated.92 
 
Nonetheless, as Cornell cautions, customary law is a very different notion of doing law, and 
indeed doing justice, than the one we have developed in the West.93 In this claim she is 
supported by John Murungi who has argued that African jurisprudence has an entirely 
different view of law as the doing of justice. According to Murungi: 
 
What is essential to law is what secures human beings in their being. The pursuit and 
the preservation of what is human and what is implicated by being human are what, in a 
particular understanding, is signified by African jurisprudence.94 
 
Not only does living customary law differ in all the fundamental aspects, such as the source, 
the process as well as the actual outcome, from the western concept of law in South 
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Africa.95 But also, principles of customary law, such as ubuntu have a profound effect on the 
actual rules and processes that guide legal conflict. The African concept of ubuntu, that 
means constituted by and through relationships with others has been explained by Mokgoro 
J as follows: 
 
Generally, ubuntu translates as ‘humaneness’. In its most fundamental sense it translates as 
personhood and ‘morality’. Metaphorically, it expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu, describing the significance of group solidarity on survival issues so central to 
the survival of communities. While it envelops the key values of group solidarity, 
compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity, in its 
fundamental sense it denotes humanity and morality.96 
 
Ubuntu therefore represents a philosophy of life, which views the individual’s existence and 
well-being relative to that group of which he or she is a part. The spirit of ubuntu is a part 
of the cultural heritage of the majority of the population that combines individual rights 
with a communitarian philosophy of human interdependence, respect and concern.97 
 
In an effort to reconcile these different notions, Jennifer Nedelsky’s work demonstrates 
that in practice rights act not as boundaries to protect autonomy, but as means of 
structuring relationships of interdependence in an unequal world. Therefore rights have a 
changing and a contested quality. All rights claims must be appreciative of the manner in 
which rights are defined. Central to any rights discourse therefore must be an 
appreciation of the fact that what rights do and have always done, is construct 
relationships, of power, or responsibility.98 Nedelsky further describes rights as ‘collective 
decisions about the implementation of core values’.99 Therefore democracy is the consent to 
an equal voice in the determination of these collective choices of core values.100 Adherents 
to religious and cultural values in a democracy for this reason must be afforded a role to 
frame their own rights claims101 under conditions of genuine freedom rather than minimum 
standards.102 Nedelsky’s point of view entails that we should move away from an 
understanding of rights as having predetermined boundaries, and be aware of the processes 
of negotiation about underlying values that change the content of rights over time. Any 
definition of rights must therefore acknowledge that people live in a context of legal and 
cultural pluralism in which these values should be allowed an equal voice in the 
determination of rights.103 In this regard Louise Vincent104 refers to what Deborah Posel105 
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has called ‘contending moral worlds’. In the one world the rational, rights-bearing, 
inherently valuable individual is placed at the centre, while the other suggests that a valuable 
person is something one becomes and that one’s relationship to others is central to this 
process of becoming. This process of becoming is also referred to as ‘African humanism’106 
or within African tradition as ubuntu. 
 
The moral world of ubuntu is in stark contrast with liberalism’s autonomous, rationally-
choosing individual subject. This contrast within the discourse on human rights is also 
often contained in the larger debate about universalism and cultural relativism.107 However, 
these ‘contending moral worlds’ may exist simultaneously within the individual. In this 
regard John and Jean Comaroff have talked of a ‘dual’ or colonial subject, at once liberal, at 
once tribal.108 As a result, there concurrently exists an aspiration to build on the indigenous, 
as well as recognition that the indigenous may present a challenge in a liberal democratic 
state dominated by market individualism.109 These ‘contending moral worlds’ are not only 
prevalent in the colonial subject, but also in the South African nation-building discourse. 
The concept of the ‘rainbow nation’ reflects a community of difference; however the notion 
of diversity contains within itself the potential for conflict or social disorder and 
consequently the impulse to homogenise. 
 
Vincent further avers that in South Africa the need to turn to ethnic tradition is 
particularly strong by those who regard themselves as excluded or disadvantaged under the 
new order, excluded for example from the state’s contractual obligations to the secure 
economic benefits for its citizens.110 Vincent argues that the reinstatement of practices 
such as virginity testing must be seen as part of a broader move for the revival of 
‘indigenous knowledge systems’ suppressed during the apartheid era.111 Conversely, this 
counter narrative of return according to Vincent depicts an imaginative universe rather 
than a ‘real’ one.112 In this regard the practice in its reinstated form has been claimed to 
have lost its essence in that the practice has been rendered profitable with the introduction 
of a fee for each test and certificate. In this regard Aninka Claassens and Sindiso Mnisi 
claim that the dangers posed by national legislation that reinforces the power of traditional 
leaders to unilaterally define custom can be addressed through customary law being 
defined as ‘living law’ that is able to reflect changing practice.113 
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VII Review of reinstated indigenous cultural and religious practices 
The Pietermaritzburg High Court in the matter of Stephanus Smit NO v His Majesty King 
Goodwill Zwelithini Kabhekuzulu114 held that the traditional practice of Umkhosi 
Wokweshwama, their bare-handed killing of a practice of Umkhosi Wokweshwama, their 
bare-handed killing of a bull may go ahead.115 The practice is a well-known, annual event 
and is a symbolic way of thanking God for the first crops of the season. The court held 
that the applicants’ grounds for seeking an interdict were ill-informed and based on a 
distorted view of the tradition of Umkhosi Wokweshwama. In essence the applicants sought 
to portray the Zulu people as barbaric, uncultured and inhuman, subjecting animals to cruel 
forms of torture under the auspices and encouragement of their King in the name of 
custom and tradition. The court further held that had the applicants possessed more 
understanding of other people’s cultures they might have been more judicious in 
accepting without question the truth of the sensational and baseless press release by a 
Kenyan-based animal rights organisation. On dismissing the application Van der Reyden J 
held that he was satisfied with the evidence of cultural expert Professor Jabulani Mapalala 
that the Animals Rights Africa’s objection to the ritual was based on untrue information and 
hearsay in that none of the persons who deposed to affidavits before this court had 
witnessed the ceremony.116 In responding to the ruling KwaZulu-Natal Premier Zweli Mkhize 
said ‘We want to promote freedom of worship and religion. Our Constitution was designed 
specifically to protect all cultures and customs practised by our people’.117 
 
Similarly in January 2007, Tony Yengeni, former chief whip of South Africa’s governing 
party, the African National Congress (ANC), celebrated his early release from a four-year 
prison sentence by slaughtering a bull at his father’s house in the Cape Town township of 
Gugulethu.118 This African ritual was performed in order to gratify the Yengeni family 
ancestors. Animal rights activists, however, decried the sacrifice as an act of unnecessary 
cruelty.119 In response the Minister of Arts and Culture, Pallo Jordan, called for a proper 
understanding of African cultural practices and Jody Kollapen, the chair of the Human 
Rights Commission, said ‘the slaughter of animals by cultures in South Africa was an issue 
that needed to be dealt with in context. Cultural liberty is an important right’.120 The 
singular portrayal of the Zulu people as barbaric, uncultured and inhuman, in that they 
subject animals to cruel forms of torture as well as condemnation of animal sacrifice as an act 
of unnecessary cruelty, as illustrated above, are both mindful of the article in LIFE in which 
the need to appoint qualified appointees to initiate the Ghanaian people from the Stone Age 
to a new Nationhood was emphasised. 
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It is evident that in these examples the adherents to religious and cultural values have been 
eager to frame their own rights claims. In response to these rights claims the state has a 
duty of even-handedness and non-identification. The relationship between the state and 
religion (and culture) should resemble an even-handed121 interaction between the state and 
religion. In the interpretation of this even-handed interaction, the right to freedom of 
religion (and culture) should be interpreted as a liberty and an equality right. The state 
should therefore refrain from favouring one religion (or culture) over others and should 
react impartially towards all religions. Coupled with the duty of even-handedness and 
non-identification, the state has a duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.122 The state, therefore, has both a negative duty of non-
interference, as well as a positive duty to act in the interests of religious freedom and 
cultural integrity, so that the rights to freedom of religion and culture may flourish. 
 
In exercising these positive obligations it is advised that the state and the institutions of 
the state should acknowledge that people live in a context of legal and cultural pluralism in 
which these values should be allowed an equal voice in the determination of rights.123 In 
allowing an equal voice for all, the establishment of a totalised system is avoided and an 
end to an anaemic understanding of human nature is promoted.124 In this regard Richard 
Sherwin illustrates that throughout history, totalised systems have produced disarray. To 
illustrate this point he refers to the story of Babel that was reduced to rubble in response 
to the objective of imposing a totalised dialect upon the inhabitants. Sherwin claims that 
the parable illustrates how the capacity to actively engage in civil society through a 
multiplicity of discourses shows a way to escape self-destruction.125 Sherwin refers to the 
quest for the acknowledgment of others as follows: 
 
Justice speaks otherwise. It occurs in the presence of, and in response to, the infinite 
demand of the Other. This response, and the unremitting responsibility to which it leads, 
marks the origin of sociality. Justice in this sense finds its model in the ethical sublime: 
the human capacity, rooted in the self-transcendence of poetic imagination, to let beings 
and Others be.126 In being responsible for the demands of the Others in the world 
according to Sherwin marks the origin of ethics.127 Sherwin continues further arguing 
‘Responsibility for the Other, and the third, who dwells beside the one I face, generates the 
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bond on the basis of which society is held together’.128 It is only when the demands of the 
Other are acknowledged that the full spectrum of humanity be allowed to cast the shadow of 
an anaemic understanding away. 
 
VIII Conclusion 
There ought to be in any rights discourse an appreciation of the fact that what rights do 
and have always done, is construct relationships, of power, or responsibility.129 In reaching 
collective decisions about the implementation of core values130 an equal voice in the 
determination of these core values ought to be provided. Some possible approaches that 
have been proffered include the constitutional Grundnorm of dignity as well as the 
principles of customary law, such as ubuntu. Therefore, the freedom to practise one’s 
religion or custom requires that a balance be struck between protecting and imposing 
cultural values. 
 
In the renegotiation of rights, there ought to be an awareness of underlying values that 
change the content of rights over time. In addition, there ought to be awareness of the 
contending moral worlds that exist within the individual who frames her rights. This internal 
conflict may indeed further be exacerbated by the state’s failure to serve the most basic 
elements of the state’s contractual obligations, such as with regard to the maintenance of 
law and order or the securing of economic benefits for citizens. In the event of failures such 
as these the temptation of those who regard themselves as excluded or disadvantaged to 
turn to re-imagined ethnic traditions soar. 
 
In applying the above referred to approach it is claimed that the whole constitutional 
purpose of establishing unity and solidarity in our diverse society would be attained 
with more certainty. Achievement of unity and solidarity requires not mere toleration of 
difference, but institutional commitment towards accommodating difference. 
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